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Knowledge-sharing, control, compliance and symbolic violence 
Abstract  
Recent developments in control hold that professionals are best managed through normative 
and concertive as opposed to bureaucratic and coercive mechanisms. This post-structuralist 
approach appeals to the notion of congruent values and norms and acknowledges the role of 
individuals’ subjectivity in sustaining professional autonomy. Yet, there remains a risk of over-
simplifying the manifestations of such control initiatives. By means of an in-depth case study, 
this article considers the challenge of implementing a knowledge-sharing portal for a 
community of R&D scientists through management control initiatives that relied on a blend of 
presumed ‘peer pressure’ and the rhetoric of ‘facilitation’. Arguing that traditional approaches 
such as normative/concertive control and soft bureaucracy only partially explain this 
phenomenon, we draw from Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘symbolic violence’ to interpret a 
managerial initiative to appropriate knowledge and affirm the structure of social relations through 
the complicity of R&D scientists. We also examine how the scientists channelled resistance by 
reconstituting compliance in line with their sense of identity as creators of knowledge.    
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Introduction 
Following Waring and Currie’s (2009, p.767) finding that ‘attempts to engender normative 
change and compliance amongst clinicians remain problematic,’ this paper puts forward the 
argument that understanding how organizations ‘manage’ professionals requires a shift in 
emphasis away from the contemporary emphasis on how managers impose normative control 
strategies to how they construct willing compliance. With reference to Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic violence, we examine how an organization pursued a subtle form of control to realize 
knowledge sharing, relying on the acquiescence of R&D scientists who nevertheless 
accomplished some degree of resistance by defining compliance on their own terms. Symbolic 
violence refers to the exercise of force or power upon social agents with their complicit 
acceptance (Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Bourdieu illustrates this concept in 
various ways, such as in gift-giving, an act whose embedded reciprocity imposes a form of 
domination over the recipient, ultimately misrecognizing the economic reality of the exchange, 
and in the process realizing a subtle form of control. Thus, we contribute to the understanding 
of control by problematizing compliance and discovering how it constitutes a manifestation of 
employee resistance.  
           Recent critiques of normative control point to the increasing tendency to distract 
employees’ attention from the dysfunctions of conventional controls while ultimately only 
prescribing ‘freedom around control’ (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011). Drawing from Weber and 
Crozier, Courpasson (2000, p. 142) posits the notion of ‘soft bureaucracy’ whereby domination 
arising from the legitimate use of power is not ‘exerted by means of, for example, violence, 
direct punishment or local hierarchical supervision, but through sophisticated managerial 
strategies.’ The notion of ‘soft bureaucracy’ to achieve ‘political centralization’ while 
recognizing that organizations are more entrepreneurial and decentralized is one that we find 
particularly pertinent for this paper. Courpasson’s purpose is to understand domination in terms 
of the strategies senior management develop ‘to control elite groups’ (Courpasson, 2000, p. 
152). He found that senior management resorted to a strategy of ‘proving and normalizing 
professional success’ which included assessment grids and criteria to define success, and a 
strategy of ‘objectivating personal responsibility’ to manage through pragmatic performance 
indicators.   
             In our case study, a global confectionary firm we name Confect, senior management 
developed no such metrics. Rather than produce mechanisms for defining expected activities, 
and attribute initiatives and decisions, senior management treated a highly publicised 
knowledge-sharing system as purely voluntary. We wanted to look beneath the stated notion 
3 
 
of ‘voluntary participation’ to understand why management would go to the lengths of creating 
a top-level global knowledge management team to oversee this resource-critical initiative and 
yet treat it as purely voluntary, put little or no visible mechanism in place to monitor use and 
effectiveness, and leave it entirely to the discretion of a community of researchers with little 
mention of ‘bottom-line’ implications. We seek to shed new light on the organizational pursuit 
of legitimacy by examining how domination is realized not through managerial strategies 
informed by ‘threat and potential repression’ (Courpasson, 2000, p. 159), but through a subtle 
appeal to willing compliance that is neither extracted through performance management 
mechanisms nor stimulated by rewards as in normative control. As we discuss below, 
normative control itself is prone to creating oppressive effects (Barker, 1993). 
            We contend that both normative and coercive approaches only tell part of the story, and 
do not sufficiently account for compliance either as genuine acquiescence or a form of 
resistance. Furthermore, we argue that compliance does not, unlike orthodox normative control, 
necessarily assume that employees will subscribe to the managerial narrative because it is 
consistent with their own values and aspirations. Thus, we draw from Pierre Bourdieu’s social 
theory to examine how the quest for compliance relies on mis-recognizing control strategies. 
Our key contribution is to demonstrate the use of power which relies not on coercive or 
normative control but on the (Bourdieusian) complicity of highly autonomous professionals (in 
this case R&D scientists) who are nevertheless prepared to define their compliance on their 
own reflexive terms.   
          The context of this analysis is a knowledge-sharing corporate initiative rather than 
control for its own sake. It is therefore necessary to set out briefly the case for knowledge 
management. Prior research has tended to focus on deriving ‘rents’ from productive activities 
(Grant, 1996), the integration, diffusion, and protection of knowledge (e.g. Ambrosini & 
Bowman, 2001; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), thus ensuring effective sharing and preventing 
leakage (Tallman & Phene, 2007). A more critical strand has developed which looks at how 
knowledge is reified, the political, ideological, identity, situated, and power issues associated 
with ‘managing’ and appropriating knowledge (e.g. Bowman & Swart, 2007; Brivot, 2011; 
Collins & Smith, 2006; Kamoche & Maguire, 2011; Schultze & Stabbel, 2005; Tsoukas, 1996), 
thus shedding light on how and why individuals might act in their own self-interest. Previous 
attempts to understand how knowledge management systems secure the knowledge of 
organizational members and disseminate it to other potential users have drawn for example 
from social capital theory (Dyer & Nobeaka, 2000; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Foss, Husted and 
Michailova (2010) found that much of the knowledge sharing literature is concerned with 
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constructs, processes largely at the ‘macro’, i.e. collective/organizational levels. They call for, 
inter alia, research into how governance mechanisms shape employees’ knowledge-sharing 
behaviour, a call we heed with respect to the role of control.    
          The debate on experts/expertise, professionals, identity and culture within knowledge-
intensive firms (KIFs) (Alvesson, 1993; Robertson & Swan, 2003) is particularly pertinent to 
this paper. For example, Robertson and Swan (2003) explore the theme of knowledge workers 
conniving in their own control with respect to Willmott’s (1993) notion of slavery. Thus, 
‘instead of top-down normative control, where those in power generate norms for those who 
are not, […] consultants themselves developed strong norms based on ambiguity that secured 
both their own freedom and their own slavery to the organization’ (Robertson & Swan, 2003, 
p. 852). Reed (1996) suggests that technologies not only permit high degrees of visibility and 
transparency, but they also lead individuals to internalize ‘self-discipline and control’. 
Individuals allow their subjectivity to be defined through surveillance (Sewell, 1988), as 
transparency and visibility prevent them from hiding from the ‘supervisory gaze’ (Reed, 1996). 
This is an important analytical tool for unravelling control that is deliberately geared at 
subjugating the individual through normalization. However, where efforts at normalization 
through disciplinary control and subjection (Foucault, 1975) are either incomplete or 
ambiguous as in Confect, it is necessary to seek alternative explanations for actions consistent 
with this apparent ‘self-discipline’.     
          Confect introduced a knowledge management system in a subtle and non-threatening 
manner which they described in terms of ‘leadership and facilitation’, and expected to rely on 
peer pressure rather than overt control. Yet, to the extent that social actors ultimately determine 
the extent and degree of their involvement in sharing knowledge, the organization’s capacity 
to secure legitimacy for the knowledge appropriation system is potentially circumscribed. This 
suggests a need to determine how individual reflexivity constitutes a potential challenge to 
managerial exhortations to share knowledge and how it constitutes a form of resistance. While 
recognizing that employee resistance is closely tied to managerial control mechanisms (e.g. 
Jermier, Knights and Nord, 1994; Waring & Currie, 2009) the intriguing question for us was 
how management expected to secure compliance without overtly relying on normative or 
coercive control. Pierre Bourdieu’s work seemed appropriate in our analysis because of the 
way Bourdieu treats power, control, and legitimation in social settings defined by the use of 
capital in organizational and institutional fields in which there is no visible conflict (Oakes, 
Townley, & Cooper, 1998), which is particularly pertinent to our case study. In particular, we 
consider Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence suitable because it is about relations of 
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domination, and for its focus on the struggles between ‘fractions’ within ‘dominant classes’ 
united by habitus rather than class conflict, and its concern with tensions that are not always 
recognized for what they are (see also DiMaggio, 1979).       
          We seek to examine how a ‘dominant’ authority (in this case a senior management team) 
sought control with the complicity of the ‘dominated’ (R&D scientists) (Bourdieu, 1991; 
Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Yet, to the extent that the latter exercise agency and are prepared 
to calibrate their compliance, the boundary between ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ becomes 
blurred. Our focus on Bourdieu’s less well-known concept of symbolic violence does not imply 
that symbolic violence can be viewed as separate from his better known concepts, capital, 
habitus and field. In fact, these four are best seen as ‘an architecture’ of interrelated concepts, 
whereby symbolic violence is objectified in physical objects, certificates and other forms of 
cultural capital as well as in persons as habitus (Robinson & Kerr, 2009; Wacquant, 2002).    
           Prior research has considered how professionals such as medical practitioners (eg 
Doolin, 2002; Waring and Currie, 2009) and lawyers (Brown and Lewis, 2011:880) consent to 
participate in knowledge creation and to adhere to bureaucratic procedures in ways that affirm 
their status and identity. Our purpose is to examine how this compliance is triggered through a 
managerial narrative which operates by concealing (ie mis-recognizing) its intent. Below, we 
offer a brief critique of the normative control literature, and set out our rationale for positing a 
symbolic violence approach. We then offer the case study, and consider how the scientists’ 
own experience and conception of knowledge-sharing challenged yet legitimized the 
managerial knowledge-sharing initiative. We conclude with some thoughts for further research.    
Control, resistance and complicity 
Whereas the definition of the artefacts of knowledge was previously accompanied by important 
sociological questions about the powerful role of the ‘technocracy’, (e.g. Bell, 1973; Drucker, 
1993; Galbraith, 1967), the current preoccupation with knowledge management is largely about 
constructs (Foss et al., 2010) and the mechanisms of sharing knowledge (e.g. Dyer & Nobeoka, 
2000; Hansen, 2002; Tallman & Phene, 2007). This approach appears not to have fully engaged 
the question of power and control (see also Bartunek, 2002; Clegg, 2002; Hinnings, 2002). 
This is a worrying trend given what we know about the role of power in and around 
organizations, the prevalence of management controls on human behaviour, the ‘politics of 
expertise’ (Alvesson, 2001; Drazin, 1990; Reed, 1996), trust, domination and legitimacy 
(Courpasson, 2000; Grey & Garsten, 2001), and the quest for emotional identification with the 
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firm (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011; Kunda, 1992). Following earlier debates on the tension between 
rewards and control over expertise (Reed, 1996), scholars have begun to explore issues such 
as how professionals negotiate claims to ‘property’ in their knowledge (Pinnington, Kamoche, 
& Suseno, 2009), and the ‘struggle of ownership’ between actors engaged in contests over 
‘value capture’ (Bowman & Swart, 2007, p. 488). 
          Traditionally, scholars have related normative control to professionals as it departs from 
coercive control and relies on instilling shared values, beliefs and attitudes (Etzioni, 1964). It 
is consistent with ‘clans’ which rely on socialization to eliminate goal incongruence, high 
degrees of interaction and frequent communication and sharing of ideas (Ouchi, 1979; Turner 
& Makhija, 2006). A critique has emerged which challenges the insidious effects of 
normative/concertive forms of control which rely on fostering and rewarding the desired norms 
and values (e.g. Alvesson, 1993; Barker, 1993; Kunda, 1992; Robertson & Swan, 2003; 
Willmott, 1993). Barker (1993) found that ‘concertive control’ which also relies on normative 
rules and value consensus generated through members’ interactions ultimately achieved even 
tighter control. Through shared values they themselves created and policed, the ‘team members 
had become both their own masters and their own slaves’ (Barker, 1993, p. 433). Robertson 
and Swan (2003) have shown how normative control was achieved through the regulation of 
identity based on elitism, whereby scientists lent their loyalty and compliance to corporate 
objectives and consented to collaborate on projects because they effectively tied their identity 
as ‘the experts’ to the corporate identity of elitism the firm fostered. Fleming and Sturdy (2011) 
challenge the authenticity of the experience of identifying with the work itself through playful 
expressions of self.   
         Taken together, these contributions demonstrate that the presumption of goal-congruence, 
interest-alignment and shared values is prone to generating oppressive effects (Kunda, 1992; 
Willmott, 1993). We build on this critique to re-examine the nature of acquiescence that is 
framed in terms of the seemingly ‘willing’ participation of employees. In Barker’s (1993) case 
study, peer pressure was effective in creating a control regime that worked through shared 
value consensus. Similarly, Raelin (2011, p. 142) argues that team members can ‘presumably 
control themselves collectively by identifying those among the group who are shirking or 
failing to achieve productive targets’. At Confect, management relied on presumed peer 
pressure which they hoped would realize compliance; yet where pressure peer came into play, 
and it functioned in surprisingly different ways.  
         Evidence shows that the use of power and control triggers acts of resistance ranging from 
overt, antagonistic/recalcitrant actions towards capitalist production, to a more dialectical, 
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negotiated scenario and the appeal to subjectivity and the discursive practices individuals 
engage in to co-opt and adapt bureaucratic procedures, to reclaim their identity and redefine 
power relations (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Ball & Wilson, 2000; Collinson, 1994; 
Courpasson, 2000; Delbridge & Ezzamel, 2005; Doolin, 2002; Symon, 2005; Thomas & 
Davies, 2005; Waring & Currie, 2009). Thomas and Davies (2005, p. 685) argue that the 
tendency to construct resistance ‘within a negative paradigm, a worker corps kicking back 
against management control’ means that certain groups and certain nuances of resistance, and 
motivations for resisting remain under-researched. Delbridge and Ezzamel (2005, p. 606) argue 
that the debate on control based on values, traditions and beliefs has led to further interest in 
control through ‘internalized compliance’ as opposed to ‘external constraint’. Fleming (2012) 
argues that control is generating new forms of resistance which allow individuals to seek 
meaning in other aspects of their lives, rather than identifying with the organization.  
           It seems to us there is a need to enhance understanding of the nature of compliance, how 
it is elicited, and how it recursively constitutes a form of resistance particularly amongst 
professionals such as R&D scientists who enjoy high degrees of operational autonomy and 
whose knowledge is closely woven into their conception of identity. While Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) describe managers as ‘knowledge-engineers’, a view that invests in managers 
positional legitimacy in the exercise of power and control, Swan, Scarbrough, and Robertson 
(2002) have characterized managers’ ability to exploit ‘communities of practice’ in order to 
legitimize new practices where they recognize they are up against more powerful professional 
groups. These scenarios highlight the contested nature of the knowledge-appropriation context, 
one in which tacit knowledge is not directly appropriable because it cannot be directly 
transferred (Grant, 1996), and where it cannot be taken for granted that people will willingly 
share knowledge (Currie & Kerrin, 2003; Konstantinou & Fincham, 2010). This in turn raises 
important questions not just about power asymmetry but also about identity, whereby 
individuals either through strong cohesive groups or individually come to identify themselves 
with certain work practices and determine the form and extent of their engagement with 
technology (Shamir, 1991), or with management practices (Doolin, 2002).   
Bourdieusian symbolic violence 
The significance of Bourdieu’s relational theory of sociology which embraces his key 
constructs, capital, habitus, and field is now increasingly acknowledged (DiMaggio, 1979; 
Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Bourdieu argues that the possession of capital (e.g. cultural, 
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symbolic, economic, juridical, educational), confers on the holder powers that have the 
potential to re-define the configuration of power relations. An emergent body of work has 
focused on these three constructs (e.g. Cooper, 2008; McLeod, O’Donohue, & Townley, 2009; 
Morean, 2009; Mutch, 2003; O’Mahoney, 2007; Oakes et al., 1998; Townley, Beech, & 
McKinlay, 2009). A Journal of Management Studies special issue (Lampel & Meyer, 2008) 
was devoted to the notion of ‘field-configuring events’ where the conception of field drew 
heavily from Bourdieu’s work.    
           Symbolic violence manifests itself in three ways which are key to our analysis: it seeks to 
change ‘what is at stake’ through the power of pedagogy; it invokes mechanisms of social control 
which are not always explicit; and it works through mis-recognition, realizing while denying 
social realities (Bourdieu, 1998, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Pedagogy is equivalent to 
learning a new language, and more importantly, acquiescing in the legitimacy of this language 
and accepting it as the legitimate way to communicate. Bourdieu and Boltanski (1984) illustrate 
this by showing how a language assumes legitimacy even amongst those who do not speak it 
but nevertheless accept its superiority to theirs as in the case of an ‘official’ language. The 
‘dominated’ succumb to meconnaisance (misrecognition) brought about by the reconnaissance 
(recognition) of the legitimacy of the superior language (Bourdieu & Boltanski, 1975). Thus, 
the use of a ‘superior language’, gift, or the educational system imposes a ‘cultural arbitrary’ to 
express the objective interests of the dominant groups/classes.  
          The ‘cultural arbitrary’ is a condition that expresses the arbitrary imposition of power by 
misrecognizing its effects and purpose and ultimately reproducing and legitimizing social 
inequality. Moore (2004, p. 447) captures the essence of the cultural arbitrary as follows: ‘Once 
it is acknowledged that the positions and relations of the cultural field are valorized by power 
relations rather than by aesthetic qualities inherent to them, then they can be recognized as 
arbitrary and their imposition through pedagogic action seen as constituting “symbolic violence”’. 
Thus, dominant groups conceal the fact that their cultural power (achieved for example through 
a ‘superior’ language) reproduces while disguising social stratification and class interests 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). The effect of symbolic violence is that the 
dominant group determines the appropriate way to function, and acquires legitimacy for arbitrary 
power relations - a ‘cultural arbitrary’ - (in our case a knowledge management portal) through 
the complicity of the ‘dominated’. There is nothing inherently or intrinsically superior about the 
portal; it has meaning only relationally, meaning that it reflects the tastes and interests of those 
who ‘arbitrarily’ hold power (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Robinson and Kerr (2009) show how 
symbolic violence becomes a way of conceptualizing legitimate domination, where structural 
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domination is misrecognized by followers as ‘charm’, or ‘as the attributes of the ‘natural leader’ 
(Robinson & Kerr, 2009, p. 881).They have also examined how symbolic violence in banking 
came to be maintained by ‘economic violence’ which in turn counted as symbolic capital outside 
the organization; thus symbolic violence truly becomes a relationship of domination (Kerr & 
Robinson, 2012). Besides the educational context (Moore, 2004), the concept of a ‘cultural 
arbitrary’ is beginning to generate some interest in organization studies. For example, Kamoche 
and Pinnington (2012) have examined the ideological underpinnings of organizational 
spirituality through the lens of symbolic violence, with reference to the cultural arbitrary of 
managerial power and the effects of pedagogy.  
         By relying on complicity as opposed to coercion, symbolic violence has resonances with 
‘concertive control’ in self-managed teams, and members’ collaborative actions (Barker, 1993), 
but goes further by tying complicity to misrecognition, ideology and legitimation. While it 
appears to be taken for granted that socialized professionals grant the organization their 
complicity as they respond say to symbolic and financial rewards (Kunda, 1992), symbolic 
violence allows us to problematize complicity and also to understand how it constitutes a form 
of resistance. Conflict and resistance are as prevalent as compliance and consent (Jermier et al., 
1994). Resistance manifests itself to the extent that compliance is never a fait accompli but is in 
part contingent on the way individuals define the form and extent of participation in managerial 
exhortations to share knowledge. Thus, we position our contribution in terms of how 
management sought voluntary compliance for a knowledge-sharing portal while misrecognizing 
the power-political dynamic that was central to realizing managerial control.   
     
The Confect Case Study: research setting and methodology  
Confect is a global confectionary maker which employs about 60,000 people worldwide. We 
selected this firm in order to examine the circumstances surrounding its introduction of a new 
knowledge management system which, during a two-year period after its inception, had created 
a buzz in the Australia media. It seemed appropriate to opt for a case study approach that would 
enable us to hear the voices of the management team that was spear-heading the initiative, as 
well as a sample of R&D scientists for whom the knowledge-sharing portal had been created. 
Our purpose was to interpret the phenomenon at the level of meaning, to develop theory as 
opposed to pursuing empirical validation. This approach is consistent with prior work on 
control (e.g. Barker, 1993; McLoughlin, Badham, & Palmer, 2005; Robertson & Swan, 2003) 
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and on Bourdieu’s social theory (e.g. McLeod et al., 2009; Morean, 2009; Oakes et al., 1998; 
Robinson & Kerr, 2009) which informs our analysis.  
           We held a total of fifteen interviews, three in Phase 1 (1 male, 2 female), and twelve in 
Phase 2 (6 male, 6 female). Phase 1 took place in Australia in 2007, with the globally dispersed 
executive Knowledge Management Team (KMT) which comprised of three people: Global 
Technical Director (GTD), Knowledge Process and Data Manager (KPDM) (both based in 
Australia); and Technical Knowledge Manager (TKM) (based in the UK). The KMT reported 
to the VP, Technical Knowledge, who was based in the USA. This team was responsible for 
introducing a knowledge management system for the company’s research scientists and 
technicians. Extensive interviews based on a semi-structured questionnaire were conducted 
with the three executives: face-to-face with the two Australia-based ones, and by tele-
conference with the UK-based one. Using standard case study protocol (Yin, 1994), 
respondents were asked open-ended questions followed by probing questions. These interviews, 
which on average lasted ninety minutes, covered a wide range of topics on the company’s 
objectives in setting up a knowledge management system, the types of knowledge-sharing the 
system was designed to accomplish, the challenges that were being faced in the process and 
how these initiatives were linked to human resource practices.  
          Access to scientists was not granted until three years later (Phase 2), a delay which 
ultimately worked in our favour by enabling us to take stock of how the knowledge 
management system had unravelled, and the extent to which it had become embedded and 
accepted. Nevertheless, access was limited, and we interviewed five managers and seven R&D 
staff, four in the UK and three in Australia. The approach we took and the number of subjects 
interviewed are considered adequate for a case study analysis (Yin, 1994; Easterby-Smith, 
1994). For Phase 2, the interviews in Australia were by telephone and those in the UK face to 
face. The R&D staff and Phase 2 managers were selected from those who were available and 
willing to speak to us. The interviewees were evenly spread; amongst the seven males: four 
managers and three R&D staff; amongst the eight females: four managers and four R&D staff. 
In Phase 2 of the project, interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes. Questions to the R&D staff 
revolved around their reasons for, and experience of knowledge-sharing, and their exposure to 
the knowledge-sharing technology. We did not specifically seek to confirm/corroborate the 
claims made by the managers, but instead wanted to allow them to tell their own story of 
knowledge-sharing.    
           All the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. We triangulated them with 
archival materials relating to the strategic thinking behind the inception and operation of the 
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knowledge management system, various published reports, some company newsletters, and 
our field notes. Guided tours of the office, factory and recreational premises where we were 
able to observe people at work, also gave us a useful glimpse into the working lives of the 
employees, the pressures they endured to deliver new products through collaboration, and the 
sense of community they wished to create and be a part of. The data were analysed using 
inductive techniques in order to gain in-depth knowledge of a process within a single case 
study, as opposed to capturing a snap-shot at a point in time (see also Ragin, 1994). In an 
approach consistent with narrative analysis and interpretation (Gabriel, 2000; Pinnington et al., 
2009), the transcribed responses were checked against the tape-recordings and field notes, 
coded according to topic and subjected to a series of iterations until specific themes and stories 
began to emerge. These themes and stories were corroborated against each other and double-
checked against the field notes, thus ensuring the integrity of the data. Our analysis was guided 
by replication rather than sampling logic (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994), 
and aimed to critique and extend extant theory on control within the context of knowledge 
management.  
Research findings  
The centre piece of the knowledge management (KM) system at Confect was an online sharing 
space, hereafter referred to as Confect-Portal, in which project or product research 
‘communities’ were encouraged to participate through interaction and knowledge-sharing. The 
objective was to break down barriers so knowledge could be leveraged and diffused across the 
organization. This is consistent with the view that knowledge-sharing systems are designed, 
inter alia, to ‘motivate individual members to participate and contribute knowledge to the 
collective good’ (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000, p. 348). The KMT maintained that there was no 
compulsion to participate and that the purpose was to provide a virtual space whereby 
functionally-viable content would emerge organically through voluntary collaboration and peer 
pressure, and where interaction would ultimately drive performance. However, the findings 
reveal some fundamental differences between the way the KMT conceived of Confect-Portal 
and the way the R&D scientists understood and utilized it. We juxtapose these realities and 
proceed to offer a theoretical interpretation of what we perceive to be management’s underlying 
purpose in creating the portal. First we discuss our initial observation of two themes which 
emerged as characterizing the functioning of the knowledge-sharing mechanism, and which 
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pave the way for an explication of symbolic violence: (1) leadership and the rhetoric of 
facilitation, and (2) subtle control through presumed socialization.   
Leadership and the rhetoric of facilitation 
The approach to knowledge management/sharing was framed in terms of leadership and 
empowering people:  
We do have a top-down approach, providing information that the 
leaders can communicate. The leaders are not going to be out there 
driving the knowledge activities, but they have to be visibly supporting 
them … but the knowledge that is created is really happening at the 
ground level, it’s down in the communities themselves. (GTD)  
In practical terms, leadership in knowledge sharing was operationalized amongst 
managers by including ‘collaboration’ amongst the competences (or ‘leadership imperatives’) 
that managers are judged upon. As for empowerment, a manager reported: 
I think we’ve worked on our leadership. I think that isn’t really a barrier. 
I think they see that there’s value in the job they’re doing or my team is 
doing, and they’re quite happy to go along, so long as we give them 
empowerment and they need to be led through that. (KPDM).  
After some initial resistance, the KMT understood that leadership based on a directive 
approach would not work, which shows they acknowledged the limitations of bureaucratic 
control for appropriating knowledge. According to the GTD, initial efforts to ‘obviously push 
people into sharing’ proved counter-productive and it was considered more effective ‘to note 
and encourage positive behaviours and quietly discourage negative ones’.  
People are sceptical about changing the way they’ve always done 
things … but once you sit down with them and explain the benefits so 
they get something out of the database then they’re more likely to 
contribute, but it’s just getting that change in direction that’s hard. It 
takes me, really, physically to have a meeting with those individuals to 
really change their behaviours, and there is not enough of me to go 
round. (TKM) 
 We’re not specifically targeting, you know, trying to take the tacit 
knowledge, and making it explicit and putting it into a system because 
you never quite know what is going to be useful for people, like 
something that has been useful for me might have no use at all for 
anyone else. But then something that I’m not even aware of could be 
made great use of by someone, maybe. (GTD)  
This position reflects the challenge Confect faces in adopting a suitable method to 
achieve ‘knowledge capture’. The GTD’s statement exemplifies the ambiguity surrounding the 
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value of knowledge possessed by the scientists, as well as the potential futility of micro-
managing the knowledge-sharing process. According to the GTD, while the ultimate purpose 
of knowledge management was to ‘get people to share what they know, and to use that 
information in order to generate some benefits’, the role of the KM team was ‘to get people to 
interact and share knowledge without letting the employees feel that managers are applying 
too much control’, hence facilitation, which enabled a much more subtle form of control.  
Facilitation, as a surrogate for leadership and control, was the catchphrase that drove 
through the KM experience at Confect: facilitation from top to bottom, from managers to 
scientists and amongst the scientists themselves and even across functions. While the portal’s 
key customers are the R&D group, the ethos of facilitation was expected to spread across the 
firm. However, we found only scanty evidence of how it worked in practice, which leads us to 
the view that it was more hype and aspiration than a concrete and realizable strategy.      
The rest of the organization is watching what we’re doing …like the HR 
[group] have shared a lot more information based on them coming and 
discussing with us what we’re doing … the Finance people have done 
the same. So, though we haven’t got direct responsibility for those areas, 
what we’re doing is influencing them. (GTD) 
The above shows how the expected effect on other departments lends credibility to, and 
is a potential source of legitimacy for the KMT’s knowledge-sharing initiative. The expression 
‘facilitation’ was used repeatedly to signal the idea that there was no compulsion, and that 
management’s purpose was merely to create an enabling environment, even though there was 
no mechanism to evaluate the system, unlike the assessment grids and criteria Courpasson 
(2000) found. Except for some basic internet tools that kept tabs on frequency of visits (i.e. 
portal activity), there were no tangible metrics to measure the effectiveness of Confect-Portal 
as a knowledge-sharing and networking system. Instead, management relied upon ambiguous 
observations that included: subjective perceptions about ‘volume of collaboration’, ‘strong 
pool of resources’, perception of ‘faster and bigger results’, ‘enhanced sense of community’, 
‘selflessness’, ‘enhanced trust’, etc.    
It was noteworthy that some of the product communities took the initiative to engage in 
some form of self-evaluation which was about improving themselves, and which demonstrates 
how they chose to assess participation on their own terms based on the meanings they 
themselves attached to the portal.     
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… we meet at an innovation forum once a month and share issues like 
are we joining up effectively and what can be done to improve. 
(Innovation Planner)  
One example of facilitation in action which also served as a form of positive 
reinforcement was when an American team started to research fruit-flavoured beverages. 
Working through the portal, they discovered that a European team had recently developed a 
fruit-flavoured product. The KM team reportedly played a key role in facilitating an 
understanding of the need for the European team to pass on their knowledge to ‘avoid 
reinventing the wheel’. Similar initiatives were cascaded through public recognition in 
newsletters, praise and by facilitating emulation in the rest of the community. The KMT did 
not believe facilitation was a foregone conclusion. The GTD reported that facilitation is prone 
to ‘drying up, and you therefore need continuity through management initiative’, which meant 
resorting to residual managerial control. Facilitation thus emerges as the subtle use of power to 
influence behaviour through social interaction, but if that failed, other forms of control 
(couched as ‘management initiative’) could be employed. The challenge for the global KMT 
is how to ensure that managers remain the ‘knowledge engineers’ (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) 
who are in the driving seat and yet remain inconspicuous in order not to alienate the community 
of scientists with obtrusive control mechanisms. Yet, questions arose as to the efficacy of the 
facilitation narrative when some managers who managed R&D staff appeared to be 
inadequately informed about the KMT’s purpose.  
I thought [GTD] was setting a couple of intranet sets – where you can 
go and post up information.  I don’t know what specifically [GTD] had 
done only because he was involved in so many different things and I 
wasn’t involved in most of them. (Regulatory Affairs Manager) 
 This ambiguity reveals the limits of facilitation, and suggests to us the beginnings of 
mis-recognition. The KMT correctly assessed the significance of collaboration and teamwork, 
but their assumptions about how the process of scientific collaboration worked did not entirely 
tally with the scientists’ own experience. All the scientists agreed that their work involved a 
high degree of collaboration, by as much as 50% to 80%, and 100% in the case of one 
Innovation Planner. They also agreed that some form of virtual sharing space was crucial for 
their collaboration as it offered added value to the ‘traditional mechanisms’ such as telephones 
and email. The passive and exclusive nature of the portal was captured as follows: 
It’s not so much conversational, it’s more of a repository for results you 
might have gained or reports you’ve written or information you’ve 
generated that you want everybody to share or you’d like people to look 
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at. They’re only accessible to people within that project team. (Polymer 
Chemist) 
Similarly, the scientists tend to have their own personal networks that they can use to 
identify potential collaborators, and which do not need to be mediated through a public portal 
instigated and managed from the top. The other notable shortcoming of the system was that 
certain categories, e.g. junior scientists could not post their ideas directly and had to go through 
a supervisor. As one Consumer Science Scientist said: ‘it’s more really kind of an archive to 
look back at but it’s not actually interactive information sharing.’ This obstacle was not 
apparent to the KMT. The two most commonly cited reasons for not engaging with the portal 
were: lack of time, and the existence of alternative knowledge-retrieval and sharing 
mechanisms which were more user-friendly, some of which were offshoots of Confect-Portal. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the portal was not monolithic and that scientists had found 
ways to modify or navigate around it, which demonstrates both agency and a form of resistance 
that challenged the KMT’s position and enabled the scientists to re-define participation and 
knowledge-sharing.   
Subtle control through presumed socialization  
Control relied on elements of clan and normative forms: the use of a virtual team which fostered 
interaction and communication, a shared sense of community amongst researchers united in 
their collective scientific knowledge, and a social context where specific behavioural 
performance and outcomes cannot be prescribed with any specificity nor are they directly 
measurable. Clan controls target longer-term and broader tasks and goals (Turner & Makhija, 
2006), a characteristic which is consistent with the ambiguity inherent in the functioning of 
Confect-Portal. The nature of the work itself is not ambiguous, as the scientists are charged 
with researching and delivering new recipes and products, and are subject to standard 
performance management. Following Ouchi (1980) and Wiener (1982) we argue that the 
research scientists were presumed to act in the interests of the organization through their day-
to-day work, and were expected to lend their commitment to the knowledge-sharing initiative 
(hence to the organization) without coercion and in the absence of overt surveillance (hence 
the lack of performance criteria). To further accentuate the voluntary nature of participation, 
formal rewards were deliberately excluded from this initiative. The KMT instead capitalized 
on the notion of intrinsic satisfaction under the assumption that public recognition and symbolic 
rewards were more consistent with organizationally-socialized professionals (see also Kunda, 
1992).  
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Scientists are interesting creatures. You know, a public recognition goes 
a long way …they like to be patted on the back. (GTD) 
… we’re giving a lot of public recognition to people who have shared, 
and that has changed the behaviour in a positive way rather than going 
out and looking for the negatives … we’ve got a monthly newsletter that 
goes out to a couple thousand people…the stories that these people got 
together and did that and did that great, with links back to the Portal if 
they want to go back and look at the information, and you can see, you 
know, that when the newsletter goes out, the visits to the site go up 
and … it’s more of a carrot approach than a stick approach. (GTD) 
People feel really recognised and rewarded for being in the 
newsletter … We’ve introduced a new feature called ‘tales from the 
field’, which allows us to go out there and talk to people … what they 
are doing everyday rather than the senior leaders telling them what to 
do. That’s been very successful … and they’ve found it really rewarding. 
They may have been recognised when they’re going round their 
business and people say ‘oh I read that…’ and that works well. 
(Technologies and Engagement Manager) 
Pressed further on the benefits to the individual, she said: 
I think that one of the ways that they are rewarded is through the 
newsletter … and then obviously we all have our performance review. 
If they come up with a really good idea they get recognised from their 
peers …that’s what makes them proud, that’s what makes them feel 
recognised and rewarded, the fact that they’ve created this product 
that’s now in the stores … that’s the big success. (Technologies and 
Engagement Manager)  
This positive reinforcement of behaviour in upholding consensual values and collective 
discipline, which typifies ‘concertive control’ (Barker, 1993), served management well 
because it freed them from having to use more directive, coercive, or bureaucratic forms of 
control. Comments by R&D staff about the extent of voluntary sharing attest to this:  
 
Most people are keen to look at new systems, maybe it’s the scientist in 
them but they are happy to have a go.  I have not found any resistance 
whatsoever here. (Data Specialist) 
The organizational culture was often cited to explain the willingness to share: 
We do have a culture of people who are really friendly and really open 
which I think helps. People have actually said when they come here, 
what a lovely bunch of people there are, everyone’s really welcoming. 
Perhaps it is a culture that the founders have built and from the 
beginning their whole culture was around the people, looking after the 
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people and nurturing the people. (Technologies and Engagement 
Manager) 
Thus, while the KMT relied on socialization through the R&D scientists’ presumed 
commitment to their community of practice, they were careful not to take it for granted that the 
organization could appropriate it, hence signalling the limitations of normative control:   
When you look at people leaving the company or department, have you 
actually captured that knowledge? … there’s always going to be 
information that they store in their heads that you’re never gonna get 
to. (KPDM) 
When someone actually leaves, we realize that we haven’t captured the 
information that we need to. I’m doing more mentoring programmes 
and things like that … we don’t have any sort of organized approach. 
It’s much more ad hoc and loosely implemented. It’s a gap in our 
programme. (TKM) 
The foregoing leads us to consider how the realities of sharing knowledge and resistance 
might be understood. 
The limits of sharing: resistance in action 
This section considers how sharing knowledge was shaped by the realities of the scientists’ 
training and professional socialization and how these scenarios constitute a form of resistance. 
Managers believed that the two most common reasons for failing to participate in the Portal 
were lack of time and too much information.   
A big challenge is people thinking that they don’t have time to share or 
to talk … it’s the attitude, it’s the behaviour that people think they’ve 
got such big deadlines … so that they don’t make time for those 
conference calls or for networking time. Often those times could 
actually save them time on their projects. (TKM) 
I have not encountered people being negative. People don’t mind 
sharing but it’s the time to share. The forum time and time differences 
hinder that … Getting people at the same time is the difficult bit – whilst 
we tell people it’s a great opportunity. It’s something that they say 
they’ll look at, at some point. (Process Systems Manager) 
The KMT believed that the potential for hoarding knowledge did exist, and that it was 
driven by selfish interests, and could be linked to concerns about job security and loss of power: 
There’s probably a little bit of reluctance to share because people think 
they are the holder of information the company couldn’t do without. 
(KPDM)  
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They’re not giving up their baby. They’re scientists. They work two 
years on something, and just hand over all their learning to someone 
they haven’t met before? (TKM)  
We’ve got experts in their field who’ve been in the company for a long 
time. And if they write that knowledge or the processes or things down 
and give them to someone else, they’ve lost, you know, they may lose, 
they feel they’ve lost part of their power and that leads to low 
employability … (TKM)  
The view above is particularly pertinent as it demonstrates that managers were aware that 
power is implicated in the knowledge appropriation regime, and was therefore a potential 
source of resistance. It was noteworthy, however, that the scientists rejected the possibility that 
people failed to share for reasons of personal career interests (cf Konstantinou & Fincham, 
2010). Similarly they did not support the management view that there was too much 
information. 
Our biggest problem is that there’s too much information on there and 
sometimes people don’t know how to find it. (Technologies and 
Engagement Manager) 
The scientists knew where to find information and how to locate potential collaborators. 
Their concerns were about the Portal not being ‘conversational’, ‘interactive’ and more 
importantly, resistance was framed in terms of professional diligence, reputation and identity. 
If you work in a project team and the results are very crucial for the 
business you might not want your senior person is already seeing results 
when it’s not really thought through finally … There is a lot of politics, 
I would say. It has more political reason than anything else … even the 
draft versions we wouldn’t let get out … We don’t want 
misinterpretation, we’re protecting ourselves. (Consumer Science 
Scientist).  
It is noteworthy that this person saw the process as political, in the sense of avoiding 
creating the wrong impression and inviting blame, as much as it was also about protecting one’s 
reputation.  
People can see that you’re making conclusions prematurely so every 
other piece of work you do is then looked on with less gravitas because 
people know that you make premature conclusions. (Principal Scientist 
2). 
This need for diligence and rigour was attributed to the nature of scientific training, as 
the scientist went on to explain: 
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What you absolutely do not do is write informal comments about what 
you think is going to happen on a forum and you’re trained to not do 
that as a scientist and if you do start doing it you’re going to start 
finding that your managers start reining you back in as well, because 
your managers are going to want to sign off reports before they’re 
shared. They don’t want you to start putting thoughts on a forum … it 
would be inappropriate from a scientific point of view to put preliminary 
findings on a forum before you’ve rigorously done the science. 
(Principal Scientist 2)  
The foregoing also demonstrated a different form of peer pressure from the one described 
by the KMT who believed that scientists who did not participate would realize they were losing 
out on vital knowledge, and would therefore succumb to peer pressure to participate. Rather 
than put pressure on individuals to share, some scientists would put pressure on members of a 
community not to share unsubstantiated claims. 
What invariably happens is that someone that likes to be process-
orientated and likes to be quality driven, starts to implement some 
rigour to these forums to stop people putting ad-hoc comments that can 
be misleading …people are discouraged from putting comments up that 
are unsubstantiated and not verifiable by scientific rigour, which then 
kills the whole forum and it stagnates. (Principal Scientist 2) 
According to this scientist, maintaining the ethos of sharing and collaboration 
paradoxically means accepting the very tenets they had been trained to eschew.  
The forums need to be essentially unmanaged, barely moderated at all 
and people need to accept there’ll be comments on there that are 
people’s thoughts on where they think the science is going to go that 
hasn’t been validated … But because we always strive to do things 
correctly, we strive for quality, we strive for perfection, we strive to do 
things professionally all of those things discourage people to put their 
immediate beliefs and their immediate scientific thoughts and their 
feelings out. (Principal Scientist 2)  
These contradictions reveal the fractured nature of the collaborative process, and 
demonstrate how the R&D staff themselves struggled to reconcile the realities of social 
networking with the rigour of scientific norms in sharing knowledge. Similarly, they require 
management to understand that not only is knowledge situated in a complex web of practices 
and professional norms, but also that a culture of ‘facilitation’ which is essentially top-down is 
inherently problematic to the extent that it fails to engage with the scientists’ everyday 
experience of knowledge-creation and sharing (see also Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). Concerns 
about intellectual property (IP) infringement found common ground between managers and 
scientists.  
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The only time [access] is restricted is if there is IP involved, it is 
probably not shared as widely until the product is properly developed. 
(Process Systems Manager) 
Sometimes there are maybe patent issues, things that maybe will restrict 
those sorts of discussions. But on the whole and certainly in the project 
teams that I’ve worked in, I’ve found people to be quite open. (Principal 
Scientist 1)  
Sometimes when you’re working on things that are that new it’s a good 
idea not to have everyone aware of what you’re doing because it then 
ceases to be confidential when it starts to creep into the public domain. 
But normally if you feel that a skill set is missing, then it’s important to 
share….you normally seek out who might be an expert and invite them 
to join you rather than display it to everybody in the company saying 
‘does anyone have any ideas on this? … you need to lock down the 
intellectual property. (Polymer Chemist) 
This scientist cited an additional concern about inadvertent knowledge leakage when 
individuals interacted with outsiders. 
Information escaping from your organization is your main fear. The 
trouble is we have a lot of people who go and meet suppliers or talk to 
other people. So if we know that a group of people are working on this… 
even if it’s just in conversation, sometimes it can be enough to just say 
‘oh Confect are doing that’ … but the trouble is you can’t control where 
some of that information goes. (Polymer Chemist)  
The above perspective is particularly important as it demonstrated that the scientists were 
protective of the knowledge and the portal within which it was created. They were prepared to 
police Confect-Portal to ensure the integrity of the system, both for the sake of the organization 
and also for their own job security and professional reputation. They had effectively tied their 
professional identity and destiny to the commercial success of the organization. Symbolic 
violence was thus assured and realized. We develop this analysis in more detail below.  
Symbolic violence in a context of knowledge appropriation 
The KM team use the symbolic power available to them to characterize Confect-Portal as a ‘space 
of possibles’ which functions ‘as a system of common reference’ (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 176), for 
sharing knowledge and defining how R&D scientists behave. They ensured that the real purposes 
of appropriating knowledge and re-affirming the extant structure of power relations are mis-
recognized for what they really are. Furthermore, we suggest that these initiatives recursively 
define what constitutes capital, thus ensuring that managerial efforts to capture and absorb 
knowledge within Confect-Portal are at once mis-recognized and legitimized (Bourdieu, 1998). 
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We observed above how collaborative efforts worked through socialization into a ‘caring culture’ 
as recognized both by management and the R&D staff. We examine this phenomenon with 
respect to the three elements of symbolic violence identified previously: pedagogy, 
misrecognition and the cultural arbitrary. 
The power of pedagogy 
Pedagogy is about learning, which is important for our purposes because it deals with the 
importance of sharing knowledge and networking. The portal brought with it a new form of 
language: terms like facilitation, networking, interaction, research community, enhanced trust, 
knowledge capture, project team and even the name Confect-Portal itself came to symbolize 
the reality the KMT was keen to create. This lingua franca inculcated the virtues of knowledge-
sharing and helped the scientists to forge their identity as knowledge-workers whether they 
engaged in Confect-Portal or not. By learning and accepting the language, they rendered the 
virtual knowledge-sharing space legitimate. 
         The complicity of organizational members thus elevated the rhetoric of facilitation and 
knowledge-sharing as part of the everyday reality of organizational functioning which started 
with the community of scientists, and was beginning to be acknowledged by other 
groups/divisions, in particular Human Resources, as reported by the KMT. Pedagogy works 
through a new form of language that is difficult to resist or reject because it appears ‘neutral 
and normal’ (Oakes et al., 1998, p. 272). The KMT sought to ‘change what is at stake’ by 
signalling that Confect was not just about generating new products; it was about how the firm 
constituted itself as a knowledge-sharing community. This was evident in the extensive media 
coverage, the public talks the GTD gave, the way the whole facilitation narrative was 
promulgated across the entire organization, as well as assessing managers on the extent to 
which they facilitated knowledge-sharing. When the learning fails to achieve the desired 
objectives, control can always be reinforced: when facilitation dries up, ‘you […] need 
continuity through management initiative’ (GTD). 
          The ultimate purpose of pedagogy as a mechanism for symbolic violence is to realize 
and legitimize control that works through complicity. This pursuit of legitimacy through the 
imposition of ideals built into a platform expected to play a unifying role and which is defined 
by misrecognition, renders Confect-Portal ideological (see also Beyer, 1981; Kamoche & 
Pinnington, 2012). We have shown how pedagogy relies on the socialization inherent in 
normative control, and suggest further that as a subtle control mechanism, it draws on the 
‘unconscious strivings’ of employees (Willmott, 1993, p. 523) who are inspired to internalize 
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the culture because failure to do so would be tantamount to questioning their very identity as a 
community of scientists. Thus, accepting rather than rejecting the virtual space allowed them 
to affirm and sustain the definitive characteristics of their identity, and to secure legitimacy for 
their own creative output. We see parallels here with the blend of ‘soft controls’ and formal 
bureaucratic practices to avoid ‘contestation’ and thus seek legitimacy for managerial strategies 
(Courpasson, 2000). At Confect, management achieved an important goal of enabling the 
scientists to appropriate the ‘managerial frame’ rather than to resist it, which in turn meant 
alignment with organizational control (Chreim, 2006).   
 
The nature of misrecognition  
The elements of control and misrecognition, which we consider to be inter-related, are 
particularly pertinent to this case study. With regard to control, its effects are echoed in 
Barker’s (1993, p. 435) description of concertive control which creates ‘an iron cage whose 
bars are almost invisible to the workers it incarcerates.’ However, power and domination do 
not exist ‘only in terms of asymmetry of domination […] Domination, therefore implies action 
rather than submission’ (Courpasson, 2000, p. 144). Therefore, from a symbolic violence 
perspective, it could be argued that workers assume or are given license to reconfigure the bars 
as they deem fit: they participate on their own terms, rather than reject the ‘iron cage’ outright. 
This echoes prior findings on how professionals co-opt and adapt bureaucratic procedures (eg 
Doolin, 2000; Waring and Currie, 2009). The scientists at Confect in effect misrecognize the 
KMT’s motive for creating the iron cage in the first place. An example of management 
concealing or downplaying the pursuit of power/control is in the GTD’s exhortations to share 
knowledge ‘without letting the employees feel that managers are applying too much control’, 
which signals the intent to conceal or deny. Thus, symbolic violence manifested itself in its 
appeal for complicity via ‘voluntary participation’ while effectively mis-recognizing the 
inherent power relations that sustained and legitimized the knowledge-sharing and networking 
system. For Kerr and Robinson (2012), economic and symbolic violence were misrecognized 
as desirable capital for effective decision making.  
          Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975) apply the concept of reconnaissance sans connaissance 
(recognition without knowledge) to demonstrate how those who would have resisted the new 
order (in this case knowledge-sharing through Confect-Portal) instead lend their complicity 
and accept its legitimacy; they do not possess full knowledge of the dynamics underpinning 
their action (as the managerial control strategy has been concealed or denied), and have 
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ultimately mis-interpreted i.e. misrecognized the managerial intent behind the KMT 
knowledge-sharing portal. The complicity of the scientists, which is a form of acquiescence, 
becomes, through the lens of symbolic violence, an example of meconnaisance 
(misrecognition). This constitutes a significant achievement for the KMT: as a ‘dominant’ 
group, they determine the appropriate cultural capital (‘membership’ of Confect-Portal), but 
without expressly requiring the R&D scientists to enlist, succeed in securing their willing 
participation, in the same way society comes to accept social stratification reproduced by an 
educational system which is essentially an extension of primary socialization (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1977; DiMaggio, 1979). Equally significantly, the KMT anticipated that ‘peer 
pressure’ would ensure that the potential dissenters were in no position to reject it, even though 
the pressure ultimately manifested itself differently but achieved the desired result. The KMT 
expected that not only would the bars of the iron cage become truly invisible in Barker’s (1993) 
terms, but that the ‘inmates’ would police the iron cage through ‘peer pressure’ to ensure the 
potential dissenters did not resist by failing to participate in the portal.  
            Misrecognition can manifest itself in more overt forms, e.g. through a culture of fear, 
public humiliations and hard-nosed management (Kerr & Robinson, 2012), by invoking public 
sympathy and affective relations amongst loyal followers (Robinson & Kerr, 2009), or by 
construing commercial pursuits as service to God (Kamoche & Pinnington, 2012). At Confect, 
failure to collaborate successfully is perceived in a poor light because such individuals lose the 
respect of their peers, an indictment on their professionalism and identity. This serves as an 
effective form of control, and is consistent with Bourdieu’s view of symbolic violence as ‘the 
most economical mode of domination’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192). It is economical because it relies 
on little or no effort on the part of the dominant party, yet it is effective because the dominated 
internalize the desired behavioural change and act accordingly. 
   
The ‘cultural arbitrary’  
Bourdieu (1977) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) use the notion of a ‘cultural arbitrary’ to 
explain how the French educational system realizes the interests of the dominant groups/classes, 
reproducing while masking its contribution to these interests. Misrecognition illustrates the 
effect of imposing a ‘cultural arbitrary’ to express the objective interests of the dominant 
groups/classes (the KMT), while concealing its role in securing control. At Confect, 
misrecognition took place to the extent that the cultural arbitrary concealed its role in securing 
control and knowledge appropriation, but, ironically, was assisted by the fact that the scientists 
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protected their own interests as well. This represents an unanticipated aspect of symbolic 
violence, which we examine below with regard to resistance.    
         A cultural arbitrary also operates by denying yet rendering certain ideas as ‘unthinkable’. 
According to Oakes et al. (1998) museums and cultural heritage sites portray themselves as a 
‘business’, yet treat as ‘unthinkable’ ideas such as ‘being business-like’, ‘efficiency’, etc. They 
pursue yet conceal economic capital, thus demonstrating the notion of misrecognition. At 
Confect this ethos was captured in comments that downplayed the significance of tangible 
rewards, technology and even business results, thus rendering Confect-Portal the character of 
a Bourdieusian cultural arbitrary. This is exemplified in the Technologies and Engagement 
Manager’s comments cited earlier. Furthermore, this manager was keen to emphasize the view 
that scientists were not driven by productivity and rewards:  
 
‘scientists did not just expect a raise, or something … We are a fun company, we do make fun 
products. We want to make sure technology doesn’t take over.’ 
 
 Similarly a Knowledge Management Champion reported:  
 
‘When it comes to sharing knowledge, technology isn’t relevant at all. It’s not the main driver 
or inhibitor of knowledge-sharing. It’s about the intimacy, and closeness of colleagues sharing 
personal experiences, not obsessed with business results and technology such that when 
technology fails no one can work. We want to create opportunities for social engagement, 
conversations, etc.’  
 
Also, by insisting that performance evaluation mechanisms and rewards were not brought into 
the equation, management invoked the cultural arbitrary which concealed these ideas as 
‘unthinkable’ and encouraged the belief that the purpose of Confect-Portal was simply to 
provide researchers the space to share knowledge. Yet, if the knowledge did not translate into 
marketable products, it is doubtful whether the organization would have continued to support 
it. Similarly, Kamoche and Pinnington (2012) argue that when proponents of organizational 
spirituality deny the centrality of profits and productivity, while claiming that the purpose of 
business is to serve God, they are invoking a ‘cultural arbitrary’ rooted in symbolic violence.  
          The scientists were also categorical: they were not motivated by personal financial gain 
or organizational performance, but instead saw their identity as scientists engaged in innovation 
through networking. This view also demonstrates that the control mechanism in place differs 
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from concertive control which explicitly rewards specified forms of behaviour, thus 
demonstrating further the ‘value-added’ of our analysis. Without implying manipulation on the 
part of the KMT (which in any case, would be inconsistent with Bourdieu’s conception of 
symbolic violence), we argue that the scientists are placed in a situation where the denial or 
rejection of Confect-Portal as the right way to order their working life through collaboration and 
networking is rendered ‘unthinkable’. 
Compliance as discursive resistance 
 
Organizations do not merely rely on cultural conformity but other forms of control which, 
nevertheless inspire some form of dissent (Fleming, 2012). This section considers how 
resistance is construed as a response to symbolic violence. While research that treats resistance 
as efforts to limit the influence of managerial power (Ackroyd, 1996), is still valid, an emerging 
critique has challenged the unquestioning perspective of resistance as the rejection of practices, 
policies and new-fangled change initiatives by disgruntled workers (see Ezzamel, Willmott, & 
Worthington, 2001; Symon, 2005; Thomas & Davies, 2005). This suggests a shift from 
structuralist explanations to an engagement with subjectivity and discursive practices. 
Resistance may manifest itself through rhetorical devices (Symon, 2005), can be theorized at 
the level of meanings and subjectivities (Thomas & Davies, 2005), and can occur to defend or 
express identity (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2001), as at Confect, and where 
subjectivities are important, but not fixed constructs (Ball & Wilson, 2000; Clegg, 1994).    
          The scope for resistance exists not because of some pre-existing structural asymmetry, 
but because the KMT lacked a complete picture of the scientists’ reality of knowledge-sharing 
practices and ethos. The KMT believed there was too much information, and that Confect-
Portal was a dynamic platform for networking; the scientists had alternative mechanisms for 
networking and sometimes saw the portal as a static archive/repository, ‘not conversational’, 
‘not interactive’. Furthermore, the initial response to the culture of top-down sharing, or in the 
words of the GTD, to ‘push people into sharing’ was resisted, and it only gained acceptance 
when it was left to their discretion; only then did compliance materialize, on their own terms.  
         We found that peer pressure worked in unexpected ways. Consistent with symbolic 
violence, peer pressure ultimately worked not merely by compelling scientists to participate in 
knowledge-sharing, but to participate in a conscientious manner whereby they protected 
themselves from deleterious politics, protected identity interests - reputation and ‘gravitas’, 
hence their own capital in a contested field (Bourdieu, 1993), while also realizing the interests 
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of the dominant group, i.e. the organizational asset of intellectual property rights. We interpret 
the actions of the R&D scientists as acceptance that participating in knowledge-sharing on 
Confect-Portal through collaboration and networking is consonant with their identity as 
creators of scientific knowledge. Their response to the virtual space was informed by their 
individual dispositions in terms of who they were as (highly skilled, mostly autonomous, 
reputation-conscious) scientists. Thus, the form of resistance to be inferred was not a rejection 
of managerial strategy to use and legitimize Confect-Portal, but a discursive compromise which 
echoed the adoption/adaptation of bureaucratic procedures, subsumed agency, and re-affirmed 
their identity. In Fleming’s (2012) terms, resistance was not a cynical response to corporate 
culturalism, but was tied to something akin to ‘life itself’, and specifically, the scientists’ 
identity. Thus, while compliance constituted a form of discursive resistance, ultimately it 
demonstrates the effectiveness of symbolic violence as a control mechanism for professionals.  
 
Conclusion 
The creation and appropriation of knowledge is defined by contests over meaning, identity and 
‘ownership’, especially where ‘property rights’ are ill-defined and ambiguous (Bowman & 
Swart, 2007; Grant, 1996). Yet, the role of managerial control in these processes has not always 
been understood as researchers have tended to assume that professionals can be managed 
through socialization, rewards and ‘congruent’ values and norms. In an attempt to go beyond 
extant forms of control we drew from Bourdieu’s social theory to examine how knowledge-
sharing exhortations might be interpreted as an appeal for complicity which worked because 
the scientists tied their involvement in the portal to the way they defined themselves, a process 
which allowed them to protect their capital in Bourdieusian terms. We examined how an 
organization sought to strengthen the way it appropriates knowledge from its R&D scientists 
not by requiring them to participate in its new-fangled virtual space, nor by proffering 
(financial) incentives as in prior conceptions of normative/concertive control, but by seeking 
to facilitate a subtle blend of ‘voluntary participation’ and presumed ‘peer pressure’. This 
approach, which we interpret as ‘symbolic violence’, appeared to rely implicitly on the idea of 
seeking voluntary compliance by motivating individuals to collaborate and re-affirm their sense 
of identity within the virtual space (cf Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). The knowledge management 
team not only sought acceptance for a virtual knowledge-sharing space, but also, in the process, 
realized the legitimacy of their efforts to appropriate knowledge. The creation of Confect-Portal 
must therefore be interpreted not merely as a virtual space to create and share knowledge but 
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an arena within which the managerial prerogative in knowledge appropriation comes to be re-
affirmed through symbolic violence.  
          The scientists came to accept the legitimacy of the portal as part of their everyday work, 
and it became, for them, the right way to think and behave, even though their motives for doing 
so were somewhat at odds with those advanced by management. Following Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1977, p. 206) we contend that accepting the rationale for sharing and networking 
justifies the existence of Confect-Portal while misrecognizing the ultimate purpose which is to 
create and appropriate codifiable knowledge, rather than merely to share it. By appealing to the 
scientists’ sense of identity and by counting on their inherent tendency to police themselves as 
professionals, the risk of overt resistance is effectively neutralized. The scientists not only take 
pride in their ability to collaborate and derive satisfaction from the subsequent product 
outcomes; they also disregard the opportunity to make self-interested appropriative claims on 
their knowledge beyond deriving intrinsic satisfaction and symbolic rewards. This scenario 
reveals an ideological ethos in the way both management and the scientists subscribe to the 
‘shared’ interest of networking and knowledge-sharing while ignoring the fact that efforts to 
appropriate knowledge constitute a reconfiguration of material interests (Beyer, 1981). Hence, 
the potential incongruity of the scientists’ and Confect’s interests is swept under the ideological 
carpet by the broom of ‘facilitation’ which acts as a surrogate for control. 
         In terms of limitations and further research, we acknowledge that the relatively small 
number of scientists we were allowed to speak to is not necessarily representative of the entire 
population of the community in question. We hope, however, that this paper has furthered our 
understanding of organizational control, knowledge sharing, and Bourdieusian social theory in 
a field that has tended to assume ‘value consensus’ in sharing knowledge. Further research 
could examine how the insights generated here might be tied to the theory of knowledge as 
situated practices in order to further interrogate the context of the knowledge-creators (e.g. 
Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). Such an enterprise would be fruitful to the extent that ‘the human 
agent’s understanding resides, first and foremost, in the practices in which he participates’ 
(Tsoukas, 1996, p. 16). However, following Ringberg and Reihlen (2008) we acknowledge the 
role of cognitive processes in making sense of knowledge embedded in practices, and propose 
that further research might consider how cognitive processes might be incorporated into a 
conception of knowledge-users’ predispositions, hence Bourdieusian habitus.  
          We hope to engender further research into the problematic nature of exhortations to share 
knowledge in different organizational contexts, especially where such sharing is instigated 
centrally and fails to take adequate account of the everyday practices, sense-making abilities, 
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as well as interests of those being asked to share knowledge. Research in this genre will 
enhance our understanding of the realities of knowledge-appropriation as knowledge comes to 
be understood more and more not merely as a source of competitive advantage but also as a 
contested asset. We have focused on managerial control strategies as constituting symbolic 
violence. Yet, relations of domination can be construed in a variety of ways, involving a 
reversal of roles, rather than ‘top-down control, bottom-up resistance’. Thus, in addition to 
scenarios in which professionals re-enact bureaucratic procedures or are perceived as more 
powerful than managers, further research might consider power relations amongst 
professionals who are engaged in developing their own knowledge-sharing portal, how 
symbolic violence manifests itself amongst seemingly homogenous communities where power 
asymmetries exist along disciplinary boundaries and reflect different levels of expertise, and 
how groups use symbolic violence towards management or other groups.  
         We see Bourdieu’s work providing significant opportunities to interpret organizational 
action or re-interpret prior studies on power and control. For example, Waring and Currie (2009, 
p. 774) state that as professionals internalize management techniques, ‘it negates the need for 
top-down management controls over professionals as it fosters conformity from within 
professional work’ – we see this as the essence of symbolic violence. However, we are aware 
that some scholars consider Bourdieu’s work obscure, methodologically imprecise, and even 
incoherent (e.g. Alexander, 1995; DiMaggio, 1979; Fowler, 2000; Thompson, 1984). Calhoun 
(1995) argues that symbolic violence implies determinism, yet as Oakes et al. (1998) point out, 
for Bourdieu, strategizing to obtain important positions does not imply rational calculative 
decision-making. This claimed indeterminacy suggests the need for caution in interpreting the 
behaviour of the Confect scientists and the need for further research into agents’ behaviour 
where symbolic violence does not, as DiMaggio (1979) argues, provide for social change. 
Drawing from Bourdieu’s work does not mean an acritical acceptance of his thesis. Thus, 
contrary to Bourdieu’s position, the Confect case demonstrates that symbolic violence does not 
necessarily imply undermining the capital of the ‘dominated’. In fact, our reflexive approach 
demonstrates how the ‘dominated’ ultimately acquire the capacity to strengthen their capital 
by defining the nature and scope of their engagement with the portal.  
           Further research might also consider how scientists’ habitus, in particular their 
dispositions from past socialization, determines their decision to share or not to share knowledge, 
and how managers can begin to comprehend the specific nature of ‘discursive practices’ (Tsoukas, 
1996) of sharing knowledge that come to be accepted by scientists through their application in 
the everyday discourse of creating new products, yet remain largely alien to managers. A related 
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issue is the important practical implication of involving end-users in the creation of knowledge 
management systems, which did not happen at Confect. In closing we note that our analysis has 
relevance not merely for the individual orientations to sharing knowledge and networking, but 
also for other organizational communities/professionals where groups are pitted against each 
other and where relations are defined by contests over capital. Further research might examine 
how other categories of both ‘dominants’ and ‘dominated’ negotiate their relationship at work 
vis-à-vis the reality of the contested terrain of facilitation and similar tools of control, thus 
leading to a more discursive approach to knowledge appropriation and power relations. 
 
References 
 
Ackroyd, S. (1996). Organization contra organizations: professions and organizational 
change in the United Kingdom. Organization Studies, 17, 599-621. 
 
Alexander,  J. C. (1995). Fin de siècle social theory: relativism, reduction, and the problem of 
reason. London: Verso  
 
Alvesson, M. (2001). Knowledge work: ambiguity image and identity. Human Relations, 54, 
863-886. 
 
Alvesson, M. (1993). Organization as rhetoric: knowledge-intensive companies and the 
struggle with ambiguity. Journal of Management Studies, 30, 997-1015. 
 
Alvesson, M. & Willmott, H. (2002). Identity regulation as organizational control: producing 
the appropriate individual. Journal of Management Studies, 39, 619-644. 
 
Ambrosini, V. & Bowman, C. (2001). Tacit knowledge: some suggestions for 
operationalization. Journal of Management Studies, 38, 811-829. 
 
Ball, K.  & Wilson, D. C. (2000). Power, control and computer-based performance 
monitoring: repertoires, resistance and subjectivities. Organization Studies, 21, 539-565. 
 
Barker, J. R. (1993). Tightening the iron cage: concertive control in self-managing teams. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 408-437. 
 
Bartunek, J. M. (2002). The proper place of organizational scholarship: a comment on 
Hinings and Greenwood. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 422-427. 
 
Bell, D. (1973). The coming of the post-industrial society: a venture in social forecasting. 
New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Beyer, J. M. (1981). Ideologies, values, and decision making in organisations. In P. C. 
Nystrom & W. H. Starbuck (Eds.) Handbook of organisational design, (pp. 166-202). New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
30 
 
Boltanski, L. (1984). How a social group objectified itself: “cadres” in France, 1936-45. 
Social Science Information, 23, 469-492. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical reason. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1993). The field of cultural production. New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. & Boltanski, L. (1975). Le fetichisme de la langue. Actes, 4, 2-32. 
 
Bourdieu, P. & Boltanski, L. (1984). Le fetichisme de la langue. Actes, 1975, 4, 2-33. Cited 
in Thompson, J. B. Studies in the theory of ideology. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, J.-C. (1977). Education, society and culture. London: Sage. 
 
Bowman, C. & Swart, J. (2007). Whose human capital? The challenge of value capture when 
capital is embedded. Journal of Management Studies, 44, 488-505.  
 
Brivot, M. (2011). Controls of knowledge production, sharing and use in bureaucratized 
professional service firms. Organization Studies, 32, 489-508. 
 
Brown, A. &. M.A. Lewis (2011) Identities, discipline and routines. Organization Studies, 
32: 871-895. 
 
Calhoun, C. (1995). Critical social theory: culture, history, and the challenge of difference. 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
 
Chreim, S. (2006). Managerial frames and institutional discourses of change: employee 
appropriation and resistance. Organization Studies, 27, 1261-1287. 
 
Clegg, S. R. (2002). Lives in the balance: a comment on Hinnings and Greenwood’s 
“Disconnects and consequences in organization theory?” Administrative Science Quarterly, 
47, 428-441. 
 
Clegg, S. R. (1994). Power relations and the constitution of the resistant subject. In J. Jermier, 
D. Knights, & W. Nord (Eds.) Resistance and power in organizations, (pp. 48-60). London: 
Routledge. 
 
Collins, C. J. & Smith, K. G. (2006). Knowledge exchange and combination: the role of 
human resource practices in the performance of high-technology firms. Academy of 
Management Journal, 49, 544-560. 
 
Collinson, D. (1994). Strategies of resistance: power, knowledge and subjectivity in the 
workplace. In J. Jermier, D. Knights, & W. Nord (Eds.) Resistance and power in 
organizations, (pp. 25-68). London: Routledge. 
 
31 
 
Cooper, M. (2008). The inequality of security: winners and losers in the risk economy. 
Human Relations, 61, 1229-1258. 
 
Courpasson, D. (2000). Managerial strategies of domination: power in soft bureaucracies. 
Organization Studies, 21, 141-161. 
 
Currie, G. & Kerrin, M. (2003). Human resource management and knowledge management: 
enhancing knowledge sharing in a pharmaceutical company. International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 14, 1027-1045. 
 
Delbridge, R. & Ezzamel, M. (2005). The strength of difference: contemporary conceptions 
of control. Organization, 12, 603-618. 
 
DiMaggio, P. (1979). On Pierre Bourdieu. American Journal of Sociology, 84, 1460-1474.  
 
Doolin, B. (2002) Enterprise discourse, professional identity and the organizational control of 
hospital clinicians. Organization Studies, 23: 369-390.  
 
Drazin, R. (1990). Professionals and innovation: structural-functional versus radical-
structural perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 27, 245-263. 
 
Drucker, P. (1993) Post-capitalist society. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
 
Dyer, J. H. & Nobeoka, K. (2000). Creating and managing a high performance knowledge-
sharing network: the Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 345-367.  
 
Dyer, W. G., Jr. & Wilkins, A.L. (1991). Better stories, not better constructs, to generate 
better theory: a rejoinder to Eisenhardt. Academy of Management Review, 16, 613-19. 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. & Lowe, A. (1991). Management research: an introduction. 
London: Sage.  
 
Easterby-Smith, M. (1994). Evaluating management development, training and education, 
Aldershot, Hampshire: Gower. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14, 532-50. 
 
Emirbayer, M. & Johnson, V. (2008). Bourdieu and organizational analysis. Theory and 
Society, 37, 1-44. 
 
Etzioni, A. (1964). Modern organizations. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Ezzamel, M., Willmott, H., & Worthington, F. (2001). Power, control and resistance in ‘the 
factory that time forgot’. Journal of Management Studies, 38, 1053-1079. 
 
Fleming, P. (2012) ‘Down with Big Brother!’ The end of ‘Corporate Culturalism’? Journal of 
Management Studies, 50: 474-495. 
 
32 
 
Fleming, P. & Sturdy, A. (2011). Being yourself in the electronic sweatshop: new forms of 
normative control. Human Relations, 64, 177-200. 
 
Foucault, M (1977). Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. London: Allen Lane. 
 
Foss, J. N., Husted, K., & Michailova, S. (2010). Governing knowledge sharing in 
organizations: levels of analysis, governance mechanisms, and research directions. Journal of 
Management Studies, 47, 455-482. 
 
Fowler, B. (Ed.) (2000) Reading Bourdieu on society and culture. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
 
Gabriel, Y.  (2000). Storytelling in organizations: facts, fictions and fantasies. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Galbraith, J. (1967). The new industrial state. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Gherardi, S. & Nicolini, D. (2002). Learning the trade: a culture of safety in practice. 
Organization, 9, 191-223. 
 
Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Management 
Journal, 17, 109-122. 
 
Grey, C. & Garsten, C. (2001). Trust, control and post-bureaucracy. Organization Studies, 2, 
229-250. 
 
Hansen, M. T. (2002). Knowledge networks: explaining effective knowledge sharing in 
multiunit companies. Organization Science, 13, 232. 
 
Hinings, C.R. & Greenwood, R. (2002) Disconnects and consequences in organization 
theory? Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 411-421. 
 
Inkpen, A. C. & Tsang, E. W. K. (2005). Social capital, networking, and knowledge transfer. 
Academy of Management Review, 30, 146-165. 
 
Jermier, J., Knights, D., & Nord, W. (Eds.) (1994) Resistance and power in organizations. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Kamoche, K. & Pinnington, A. (2012). Managing people ‘spiritually’: a Bourdieusian 
critique. Work, Employment and Society, 26, 497-513. 
 
Kamoche, K. & Maguire, K. (2011). Pit sense: appropriation of practice-based knowledge in 
a UK coalmine. Human Relations, 64, 725-744 
 
Kerr, R. & Robinson, S.K. (2012). From symbolic violence to economic violence: the 
globalizing of the Scottish banking elite. Organization Studies, 33,247-266. 
 
Kerr, R. & Robinson, S.K. (2009). The hysteresis effect as creative adaptation of the habitus: 
Dissent and transition to the ‘corporate’ in post-Soviet Ukraine, Organization, 16, 829-853. 
 
33 
 
Konstantinou, E. & Fincham, R. (2010). Not sharing but trading: Applying a Maussian 
exchange framework to knowledge management. Human Relations, 64: 823-842. 
  
Kunda, G. (1992). Engineering culture: control and commitment in a high-tech corporation. 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
 
Lampel, J. & Meyer, A. D. (2008). Field-configuring events as structuring mechanisms: how 
conferences, ceremonies, and trade shows constitute new technologies, industries, and 
market. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 1025-1035. 
 
McLeod, C., O’Donohue, S., & Townley, B. (2009). The elephant in the room? Class and 
creative careers in British advertising agencies. Human Relations, 62, 1011-1039. 
 
McLoughlin, I. P., Badham, R. J., & Palmer, G. (2005). Cultures of ambiguity: design, 
emergence and ambivalence in the introduction of normative control. Work, Employment and 
Society, 19, 67-89. 
 
Moore, R. (2004). Cultural capital: objective probability and the cultural arbitrary. British 
Journal of Sociology of Education, 25, 445-456. 
 
Morean, B. (2009). The organization of creativity in Japanese advertising production. Human 
Relations, 62, 963-985. 
 
Mutch, A. (2003). Communities of practice and habitus. Organisation Studies, 24, 383-303. 
 
Nonaka I. & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge creating company. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
O’Mahoney, J. (2007). Constructing habitus: the negotiation of moral encounters at Telekom. 
Work, Employment and Society, 21, 479-496. 
 
Oakes, L. S., Townley, B., & Cooper, D. J. (1998). Business planning as pedagogy: language 
and control in a changing institutional field. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 257-292. 
 
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
25, 129-141. 
 
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control 
mechanisms. Management Science, 25, 833-848. 
 
Pinnington, A. H., Kamoche, K., & Suseno, Y. (2009). Property in knowledge work: an 
appropriation-learning perspective. Employee Relations, 31, 57-80.  
 
Raelin, J. A. (2011). The end of managerial control? Group & Organization Management, 
36, 135-160. 
 
Ragin, C. C. (1994). Constructing social research. London: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Reed, M. I. (1996). Expert power and control in late modernity: an empirical review and 
theoretical synthesis. Organization Studies, 17, 573-597. 
34 
 
 
Ringsberg, T. & Reihlen, M. (2008). Towards a socio-cognitive approach to knowledge 
transfer. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 912-935. 
 
Robertson, M. & Swan, J. (2003). Control - what control? Culture and ambiguity within a 
knowledge-intensive firm. Journal of Management Studies, 40, 831-858. 
 
Robinson, S. K. & Kerr, R. (2009). The symbolic violence of leadership: a critical 
hermeneutic study of leadership and succession in a British organization in the post-Soviet 
context. Human Relations, 62, 875-903. 
 
Schultze, U., & Stabell, C. (2004). ‘Knowing What You Don’t Know? Discourses and 
Contradictions in Knowledge Management Research.’ Journal of Management Studies, 41: 
549-573. 
  
Sewell, G. (1988). The discipline of teams: the control of team-based industrial work through 
electronic and peer surveillance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 397-428. 
 
Shamir, B. (1991). Meaning, self and motivation in organizations. Organization Studies, 12, 
405-424. 
 
Swan, J., Scarbrough, H., & Robertson, M. (2002). The construction of “communities of 
practice” in the management of innovation. Management Learning, 33, 477-496. 
 
Symon, G. (2005). Exploring resistance from a rhetorical perspective. Organization Studies, 
26, 1641-1663. 
 
Tallman, S. & Phene, A. (2007). Leveraging knowledge across geographic boundaries. 
Organization Science, 18, 252-260. 
 
Thomas, R. & Davies, A. (2005). Theorizing the micro-politics of resistance: new public 
management and managerial identities in the UK public services. Organization Studies, 26, 
683-706. 
 
Thompson, J. B. (1984). Studies in the theory of ideology. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Townley, B., Beech, N. & McKinlay, A. (2009). Managing in the creative industries: 
managing the motley crew. Human Relations, 62, 939-962. 
 
Tsoukas, H. (1996). The firm as a distributed knowledge system: a constructionist approach. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17, 11-25. 
 
Turner, K. L. & Makhija, M. V. (2006). The role of organizational controls in managing 
knowledge. Academy of Management Review, 31, 197-217.  
 
Wacquant, L. (2002). De l’ideologie a la violence symbolique: Culture, class et conscience 
chez Marx et Bourdieu. In J. Lojkine (Ed.) Les sociologies critiques du capitalisms (pp. 25-
40). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Cited in Robinson, S. K. & Kerr, R. (2009). The 
symbolic violence of leadership: a critical hermeneutic study of leadership and succession in 
a British organization in the post-Soviet context. Human Relations, 62, 875-903. 
35 
 
 
Waring, J. & Currie, G. (2009). Managing expert knowledge: organizational challenges and 
managerial futures for the UK medical profession. Organization Studies, 30, 755-778. 
 
Wiener, Y. (1982). Commitment in organizations: a normative view. Academy of 
Management Review, 7, 418-428. 
 
Willmott, H. (1993). Strength is ignorance; slavery is freedom: managing culture in modern 
organizations. Journal of Management Studies, 30, 515-552. 
 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
